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i. intrOdUCtiOn
 Modern medicine can extend the dying process so long that a terminally ill 
patient may feel trapped in a torturous, inexorable, lingering decline.1 Sometimes the 
process takes too long and the suffering is unbearable. Some patients want to achieve 
a swifter, gentler end by ingesting medications prescribed to bring about a peaceful 
death, an option known as “aid in dying.”2 This refers to the practice of a physician 
prescribing medication to a mentally competent, terminally ill patient that the patient 
may ingest to bring about a peaceful death.3 Having such a prescription in and of 
itself has a palliative effect. Many patients who obtain a prescription experience 
elevated mood and enhanced quality of life, and therefore never choose to fill it or 
ingest the life-ending medication.4
 Enacting legislation to create an affirmative permission for aid in dying is 
difficult and has been achieved to date in just three states: Oregon (1994), Washington 
(2008)—both via ballot measures—and, most recently, in Vermont (2013) via the 
legislative process.5 In Montana, the state supreme court recognized that its citizens 
may freely choose aid in dying without a statute specifically authorizing the practice.6 
On the other hand, several states have passed legislation specifically outlawing aid in 
1. See, e.g., Atul Gawande, Letting Go: What Should Medicine Do When It Can’t Save Your Life?, New 
Yorker (Aug. 2, 2010), http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/08/02/100802fa_fact_gawande 
(“For all but our most recent history, dying was typically a brief process. . . . These days, swift 
catastrophic illness is the exception; for most people, death comes only after long medical struggle with 
an incurable condition.”).
2. This term is becoming widely accepted by organizations, including the American Medical Women’s 
Association, the American Medical Students’ Association, and the American Public Health Association, 
among others. In the past, this option was sometimes referred to as “physician assisted suicide,” but that 
term has since been rejected as inaccurate and pejorative. See Kathryn L. Tucker, At the Very End of Life: 
The Emergence of Policy Supporting Aid in Dying Among Mainstream Medical & Health Policy Associations, 
10 Harv. Health Pol’y Rev. 45, 46 n.6 (2009). Opponents continue to use the inaccurate term “assisted 
suicide,” knowing it evokes a negative response. Such tactics on the battlefield of terminology are engaged 
in virtually every socially evolving arena. See generally Hendrik Hertzberg, Senses of Entitlement, New 
Yorker (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2013/04/08/130408taco_talk_
hertzberg (“Call it what you will—enhanced interrogation or torture, collateral damage or civilian 
deaths, pro-life or anti-reproductive rights, global warming or climate change, homosexual marriage or 
marriage equality, assault rif les or ‘semi-automatic small-calibre sporting rif les with plastic accessories’—
it’s all the same, and (excepting torture and warming) it’s all, to some degree, propaganda.”). 
3. See Am. Med. Women’s Ass’n, Position Paper on Aid in Dying (2007), available at http://www.
amwa-doc.org/cms_files/original/Aid_in_Dying1.pdf (“[T]he physician . . . may provide a terminally 
ill patient with, but not administer, a lethal dose of medication and/or medical knowledge, so that the 
patient can, without further assistance, hasten his/her death. This practice is known as Aid in Dying.”).
4. Patients request aid-in-dying medication to address current anxiety about losing control, dying in a 
hospital, or suffering unbearable pain and other symptoms in the future. Physicians prescribe the 
medication, in part, to palliate those anxieties. Linda Ganzini et al., Oregonians’ Reasons for Requesting 
Physician Aid in Dying, 169 Archives Internal Med. 489, 490 (2009).
5. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.800–127.897 (West 2013); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 70.245.010–
70.254.904 (West 2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 5281–92 (West 2013). 
6. See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1222 (Mont. 2009).
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dying.7 In other states, it is unclear whether providing aid in dying exposes physicians 
to prosecution under criminal laws.8 Some states have neither a permissive nor a 
prohibitory statute and are silent on the issue of aid in dying (hereinafter referred to 
as “silent states”). Hawaii is an example of a silent state; physicians there began an 
open practice of aid in dying in 2011, governed by professional practice standards. 
Hawaii provides a model for other silent states.9 Most medical care is not governed 
by statute or court decision, but instead by professional practice standards, also 
referred to as best practices or the standard of care.10 Massachusetts is another silent 
state. This article examines the pertinent law in Massachusetts and concludes that it 
is a jurisdiction where aid in dying can be provided, consistent with best practices, 
without exposing physicians to viable criminal prosecution.11
 In 2012, Massachusetts nearly became the third state—after Oregon in 1994 and 
Washington in 2008—to pass a law that would have established a statutory 
permission to choose aid in dying.12 The measure, referred to as “Question 2,” 
enjoyed strong support early in the campaign.13 However, opponents of the measure 
outspent proponents in the final weeks of the campaign, spending $4.8 million to 
7. See, e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-106(b) (West 2013); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 16-5-5(a)–(c) (West 2013); 
Idaho Code Ann. § 18-4017(1) (2013). See infra Part II.B.1.
8. As discussed below, some states have a broad vague prohibition against “assisted suicide.” See, e.g., Ind. 
Code Ann. § 35-42-1-2.5 (West 2013); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-6 (West 2013); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 
30-2-4 (LexisNexis 2013); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. § 12.1-16-04 (West 2013); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. 
§ 2505 (West 2013). The reach of such statutes to aid in dying is unclear. A test case seeking to clarify that 
a vague prohibition on “assisting suicide” does not reach the conduct of a physician providing aid in dying 
is currently pending in New Mexico. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, 
Morris v. Brandenburg, No. D-202-CV-2012-02909 (Dist. Ct. May 9, 2012). 
9. See infra Part IV.C; see generally Kathryn L. Tucker, Aid in Dying: An End of Life Option Governed by Best 
Practices, 8 J. Health & Biomed. L. 9, 11–12 (2012) (discussing the emergence of aid in dying as a 
practice governed by best practices in Hawaii). 
10. See 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 189 (2013).
11. It is, of course, possible that an aggressive prosecutor might initiate a prosecution; however, my conclusion 
is that such a prosecution would not have a serious possibility of a conviction. A prosecutor could opt to 
prosecute a physician for any of a variety of other life-ending options, including, for example, palliative 
sedation. Defense of such a prosecution would be similar to defending a prosecution for aid in dying, 
focusing on whether the physician’s conduct comported with professional practice standards.
12. An attempt to enact a permissive measure reflects the assumption that aid in dying is not currently an 
option that patients can choose and physicians can provide. The assumption has been that providing aid in 
dying would subject physicians to criminal exposure. That assumption, this article asserts, is unfounded 
and erroneous.
13. See Robert Rizzuto, Massachusetts Voters Support Medical Marijuana and ‘Death with Dignity’ Ballot 
Initiatives, MassLive.com (June 4, 2012), http://www.masslive.com/politics/index.ssf/2012/06/
massachusetts_voters_support_m.html; see also Chris Camire, Voter Support Withered for Assisted-Suicide 
Ballot Question, SentinelandEnterprise.com (Dec. 10, 2012), http://www.sentinelandenterprise.
com/local/ci_22160837/voter-support-withered-assisted-suicide-ballot-question.
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the $1.1 million spent by Question 2 proponents.14 A barrage of advertisements 
hostile to Question 2 culminated in its defeat at the ballot box.15
 Efforts to enact an affirmative statute permitting aid in dying are politically and 
emotionally charged. This is due, in part, to misinformation promoted by a well-
organized opposition, as evident in the recent consideration of Question 2. Opponents 
of Question 2 misrepresented what the law would have allowed and campaigned to 
generate fear that a law permitting aid in dying would lead to involuntary euthanasia 
and create a culture in which there is a “duty to die.”16 Swayed by this well-financed, 
fear-based campaign, voters declined to adopt the measure.17 In late September 2013, 
polls showed 68% of voters supported allowing mentally competent, terminally ill 
patients to obtain a prescription for life-ending medication; however, the ballot 
measure failed by a 51% to 49% margin.18 Efforts to pass a law permitting aid in 
dying through the traditional legislative process in Massachusetts have also, to date, 
been unsuccessful.19
 Even though opponents have defeated measures to specifically permit aid in dying 
by employing inflammatory language and conjuring frightening images, they have not 
defeated broad public support for it among citizens, including those of Massachusetts, 
where an overwhelming majority supports access to aid in dying.20 Interestingly, it 
appears that no change in law is necessary for the practice to be accepted among the 
range of end-of-life options available to dying patients in Massachusetts.
14. Camire, supra note 13; see also Chelsea Sheasley & Monique Scott, Ballot Questions Raise Barely a Peep 
Ahead of Election, Sun Chronicle (Attleboro, Mass.) (Nov. 2, 2012), http://www.thesunchronicle.com/
news/local_news/ballot-questions-raise-barely-a-peep-ahead-of-election/article_78917d0e-e769-5bed-
b143-a8e40281aec6.html.
15. See Paula Span, How the ‘Death With Dignity’ Law Failed in Massachusetts, N.Y. Times (Feb. 6, 2012), http://
newoldage.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/06/how-the-death-with-dignity-law-died-in-massachusetts/.
16. See Wendy Kaminer, How the Catholic Church Misunderstands Death With Dignity, The Atlantic (Sept. 17, 
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/09/how-the-catholic-church-misunderstands-
death-with-dignity/262347/. 
17. See Valerie Richardson, Inclusion Key in Anti-Suicide Drive, Wash. Times (Nov. 15, 2012), http://www.
washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/14/inclusion-key-in-anti-suicide-drive/?page=all.
18. Camire, supra note 13.
19. See H.B. 1468, 186th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 2009) (discussing the Act Relative to Death with Dignity, which 
failed in the Judiciary Committee) (statement of the bill’s sponsor) (“It was a tough bill and it didn’t go 
anywhere because it’s election season.”). This statement ref lects the legislative concern that passing a 
law permitting aid in dying would result in a public backlash. See also H.B. 2233, 187th Gen. Ct. (Mass. 
2012) (discussing the Joint Committee hearing completed on March 6, 2012). The last day for the 
legislative committee to report on this bill was July 31, 2012. See id.
20. See Press Release, Public Policy Polling, Obama Holds Modest Lead in Massachusetts (Aug. 22, 2012), 
http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/pdf/2011/PPP_Release_MA_082212.pdf (showing results that 
58% of those polled in Massachusetts would vote “yes” on Question 2); see also Press Release, Pew 
Research Center, More Americans Discussing—and Planning—End-of-Life Treatment: Strong Public 
Support for Right to Die 8 (Jan. 5, 2006), http://peoplepress.org/reports/pdf/266.pdf (“A solid majority 
of Americans (60%) believe a person has a moral right to end their life if they are suffering great pain 
and have no hope of improvement.”).
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 Medical care is typically governed by professional practice standards, not by 
statutes or court decisions that either prohibit or provide affirmative permission for 
specific types of care.21 The development of best practices—also referred to as the 
standard of care—in medicine is left to physicians and regulated by the states.22 The 
existing statutory framework in Massachusetts already empowers patients to make 
autonomous decisions regarding their end-of-life care.23 Medical practice already 
embraces a variety of life-ending practices, such as withdrawing life-prolonging 
treatment, sedating a patient and withdrawing a ventilator, stopping all food and 
fluids while providing palliative care, and palliative sedation (a practice in which a 
suffering, dying patient is sedated to unconsciousness with nutrition and hydration 
withheld until death arrives).24 These all became integrated into end-of-life care—
not through specific statutory authority, but rather through emerging professional 
practice standards. In addition to these expressions of affirmative respect for patient 
autonomy, Massachusetts does not have a criminal prohibition against aid in dying.25 
Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that Massachusetts is a jurisdiction in which 
physicians may provide aid in dying subject to best practices.26
 Part II.A provides an overview of the pertinent law in Massachusetts that vests 
citizens with the power to make autonomous medical decisions. Part II.B then 
examines Massachusetts’s criminal law provisions that might have bearing on the 
practice of aid in dying, and concludes that Massachusetts law vests citizens with 
autonomy over end-of-life medical decisions, and has no law that could reasonably be 
seen to outlaw the practice. Part III argues that aid in dying can emerge in 
Massachusetts, subject to governance by professional practice standards. Part IV 
discusses how Massachusetts, as it begins to embrace the option of aid in dying 
within available end-of-life care options, can learn from the practices that have 
developed in states where aid in dying is openly practiced. Finally, Section V 
concludes by urging that aid in dying can emerge in Massachusetts without the need 
for change in state law, subject to governance by professional practice standards.
21. See 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians, Surgeons and Other Healers § 189 (2013).
22. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 271 (2006) (quoting Hillsborough Cnty. v. Automated Med. 
Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 719 (1985)).
23. See infra Part II.A.
24. The U.S. Supreme Court recognized that a suffering, dying patient has no legal barriers to access 
palliative sedation as a matter of federal law in Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 736–37 (1997) 
(O’Connor, J., concurring) (“[A] patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and who is experiencing 
great pain has no legal barriers to obtaining medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that 
suffering, even to the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death.”). Authoritative medical 
literature also recognizes this option. See, e.g., Paul Rousseau, Palliative Sedation in the Management of 
Refractory Symptoms, 2 J. Supportive Oncology 181 (2004); Susan D. Bruce et al., Palliative Sedation 
in End-of-Life Care: The Process of Palliative Sedation, 8 J. Hospice & Palliative Nursing 320 (2006); 
Nathan I. Cherny & Russell K. Portenoy, Sedation in the Management of Refractory Symptoms: Guidelines 
for Evaluation and Treatment, 10 J. Palliative Care 31 (1994).
25. See infra Part II.B.
26. See Tucker, supra note 9 (discussing similar circumstances in the emergence of aid in dying subject to 
best practices in the state of Hawaii).
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ii. MassaChUsEtts LaW gOVErning End-Of-LifE CarE
 A.  Massachusetts Law Empowers Patients to Make Autonomous End-of-Life Treatment 
Decisions
 Massachusetts’s statutory framework recognizes and respects the autonomy of 
patients in their decisions over end-of-life care. Massachusetts’s Health Care Proxies 
Law empowers patients to make decisions about their health care through an 
appointed proxy if they become mentally incapacitated.27 Under the law, a patient has 
the right to appoint a health care proxy to make decisions about the patient’s health 
care in accordance with the patient’s wishes, including decisions to withdraw or 
withhold life-sustaining treatment—even when doing so will cause death.28
 The Health Care Proxies Law contains a provision stating that the statute does 
not authorize or condone “suicide or mercy killing, or . . . permit any affirmative or 
deliberate act to end one’s own life other than to permit the natural process of 
dying.”29 It could be argued that this provision reflects a policy against aid in dying. 
Yet this language is common to many similar state statutes, including those in 
Oregon and Washington, and at least one court has held that the term “mercy 
killing” does not encompass aid in dying.30 Moreover, it is critical to recognize that a 
failure to explicitly authorize an act does not constitute a prohibition of the act. 
Legislators know how to prohibit aid in dying when it is their intention to do so, as 
discussed infra in Part II.B.1.
 In 2009, the Supreme Court of Montana concluded that a physician’s provision of 
a prescription for medication—which the patient could ingest to achieve a peaceful 
death—is neither mercy killing nor euthanasia.31 The court found the provision of aid 
in dying to be supported by the public policy of the state, as reflected in the Rights of 
the Terminally Ill Act—a Montana statute that empowers terminally ill patients to 
make autonomous end-of-life decisions.32 Baxter suggests that Massachusetts’s Health 
Care Proxies Law should be seen as reflecting that the policy of the Commonwealth 
of Massachusetts is to support autonomy in medical decisionmaking, and such policy 
would reasonably extend to the choice of a mentally competent, terminally ill patient 
to request medication that could be ingested to bring about a peaceful death.
 While Baxter provides insight into the use of the term “mercy killing” in the 
Massachusetts Health Care Proxies Law, the law contains an additional provision 
that is not found within Montana’s Right of the Terminally Ill Act and thus, was not 
analyzed by the Montana court in Baxter. The Massachusetts Health Care Proxies 
Law also states that the statute should not be construed “to permit any affirmative or 
deliberate act to end one’s own life other than to permit the natural process of 
27. See Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 201D, § 1 (West 2013).
28. See id. § 5.
29. Id. § 12.
30. See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1219 (Mont. 2009).
31. See id. 
32. See id.; see also infra Part IV.B. 
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dying.”33 Although this provision does not serve as a criminal prohibition, it could be 
argued that it serves as an implicit prohibition against aid in dying.34
 Massachusetts’s common law has long recognized and supported a patient’s right 
of self-determination over his or her course of treatment.35 This reasonably extends to 
aid in dying. Patients choosing aid in dying do not intend self-destruction, but instead 
seek comfort by both empowering themselves with control over the time and manner 
of their inevitable, impending death and shaping their death in a manner they consider 
coherent with their life.36 Many individuals who obtain a prescription never ingest the 
medication, but experience the palliative effect of comfort from knowing that they are 
able to exercise control over their death. In Oregon, about one-third of patients who 
obtain a prescription under the Death with Dignity Act choose not to ingest the 
33. Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 201D, § 12.
34. Similarly, a Massachusetts statute enacted in 2012 to ensure that terminally ill patients receive 
comprehensive counseling about end-of-life options states: “Nothing in this section shall be construed 
to permit a healthcare professional to offer to provide information about assisted suicide or the 
prescribing of medication to end life.” Mass. Gen Laws Ann. ch. 111, § 227. A statute that says it shall 
not be construed to permit an action does not, without more, erect a prohibition.
35. See Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (Mass. 1986); see also Guardianship 
of Doe, 583 N.E.2d 1263, 1270 (Mass. 1992) (“It is well settled that withdrawing or refusing life-
sustaining medical treatment is not equivalent to attempting suicide. Absent an intent to die, there can 
be no suicide. As we have previously held, a ‘death which occurs after the removal of life sustaining 
systems is from natural causes, neither set in motion nor intended by the patient.’” (citations omitted)). 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Lynch, dissented in Doe, arguing that the majority therein did not 
simply reaffirm the right to refuse medical treatment, but instead that “a competent individual has a 
legal right in this Commonwealth to commit suicide, and that others have a right to assist him or her in 
that effort.” Doe, 583 N.E.2d at 1275 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O’Connor continued:
 I would agree that the law should recognize a competent person’s right to refuse or 
withdraw medical treatment when that choice is not motivated by a desire to die but, 
instead, is reasonably motivated by a desire to avoid procedures that are in themselves, 
and not simply because they prolong life, physically or emotionally painful. Suicide, 
however, is a different matter . . . . A humane society provides support of every kind, 
including moral support, to those who are burdened in order that they may live, not 
“go,” as the Probate Court judge, with this court’s approval, would have it, in “peace.” 
No “legal system” is worthy of that appellation unless its primary function is to protect 
the most vulnerable members of society. It follows that, in the absence of otherwise 
compelling legislation, no court should recognize a legal right to commit suicide, 
whether by action (e.g., lethal injection) or by inaction (e.g., withdrawal of nutrition and 
hydration, or withdrawal of antibiotic medication to treat pneumonia). Nor should any 
court recognize a corresponding right to assist in suicide or to engage in the closely 
related practice of voluntary euthanasia.
 Id. (citations omitted). Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Nolan and Lynch, similarly dissented in 
Munoz, which he described as endorsing “a right to assisted suicide.” Norwood Hosp. v. Munoz, 564 
N.E.2d 1017, 1026 (Mass. 1971) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
36. See Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and 
Individual Freedom 199 (1993) (“[W]e live our whole lives in the shadow of death . . . . [W]e die in 
the shadow of our whole lives. . . . We worry about the effect of life’s last stage on the character of life as 
a whole, as we might worry about the effect of a play’s last scene or a poem’s last stanza on the entire 
creative work.”).
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medication and die of their underlying disease.37 The experience in Oregon suggests 
that aid-in-dying patients seek comfort and empowerment, not self-destruction.38 
Furthermore, the mental health community recognizes a clear difference between the 
act of “suicide” and the choice of a terminally ill patient to bring about a peaceful 
death.39 Accordingly, a dying patient’s act of ingesting medication to achieve a peaceful 
death is not—and ought not be—construed as suicide.40
 It is reasonable to conclude that physicians in Massachusetts may engage in the 
practice of aid in dying, subject to best practices, without risk of a viable criminal 
prosecution. Both the Massachusetts legislature and courts have recognized the right 
of an individual to make autonomous decisions about end-of-life care, even when 
death is the foreseeable result.41 As will be explored infra in Part II.B, the state has 
no statute or case law that could reasonably prohibit a physician’s conduct in providing 
aid in dying.42 Without an explicit prohibition of the practice, physicians should feel 
safe providing aid in dying subject to professional practice standards.43
37. See Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act—2012, Or. Pub. Health (Jan. 16, 2013), http://public.health.
oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/EvaluationResearch/DeathwithDignityAct/Documents/year15.
pdf; see also Ganzini et al., supra note 4, at 2.
38. The experience in Oregon is not unique to that state. In Massachusetts, at a hearing on a proposed death 
with dignity bill, Massachusetts resident Eileen Lipkind spoke of her husband, who had passed away after 
suffering from terminal cancer. She said, “Since he had absolutely no choice about dying, he wanted to 
choose when to go. He wanted his dignity.” Margery Eagan, Memory of Suffering Helps Right-to-Die Bill 
Live, Bos. Herald (Feb. 23, 2010), http://bostonherald.com/news_opinion/columnists/2010/02/memory_
suffering_helps_right_to_die_bill_live.
39. Mental health professionals recognize a distinct difference between “suicide” and the choice of aid in 
dying. The American Psychological Association advises: “It is important to remember that the reasoning 
on which a terminally ill person (whose judgments are not impaired by mental disorders) bases a decision 
to end his or her life is fundamentally different from the reasoning a clinically depressed person uses to 
justify suicide.” See, e.g., Rhea K. Farberman, Terminal Illness and Hastened Death Requests: The Important 
Role of the Mental Health Professional, 28 Prof. Psychol. Res. & Prac. 544 (1997); David M. Smith & 
David Pollack, A Psychiatric Defense of Aid in Dying, 34 Cmty. Mental Health J. 547 (1998); see also 
Tucker, supra note 2, at 46 (discussing medical and health policy organizations’ policies recognizing this 
distinction). 
40. In the states with statutory permission for aid in dying, the act is expressly not to be considered suicide as 
a matter of law and is not to be referred to as such. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 127.570(2) (West 2013); Vt. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5292 (West 2013); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.245.040(2) (West 2013).
41. See supra notes 27–29, 33–35, 38–40, and accompanying text.
42. Others analyzing Massachusetts’s statutory framework have also concluded that the state has no explicit 
or implicit prohibition against aid in dying. See Katherine Ann Wingfield & Carl S. Hacker, Physician-
Assisted Suicide: An Assessment and Comparison of Statutory Approaches Among the States, 32 Seton Hall 
Legis. J. 14, 56 (2007) (analyzing Massachusetts’s statutory framework and concluding that the state 
has no explicit or implicit prohibition against aid in dying).
43. Physicians are notoriously cautious and, therefore, a statutory safe harbor would likely increase 
physicians’ willingness to provide aid in dying. A “safe harbor only” approach is embraced in Vermont’s 
recently enacted law permitting aid in dying. After a three-year period when Oregon-style mandates 
govern practice, those mandates expire and leave governance to professional practice standards—leaving 
in place criminal, civil, and disciplinary immunities creating a safe harbor for physicians. See Vt. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 18, §§ 5289–90 (West 2013).
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 B. An Analysis of Criminal Prohibitions Governing End-of-Life Care in Massachusetts
 This section analyzes Massachusetts law to determine whether it prohibits a 
physician from providing aid in dying, asking (1) whether Massachusetts law contains 
an express prohibition on physician aid in dying; (2) whether Massachusetts law 
could be interpreted as containing an implied prohibition on physician aid in dying; 
and (3) whether Massachusetts common law prohibits physician aid in dying. Each 
analysis is addressed in turn, leading to the conclusion that Massachusetts law does 
not prohibit a physician from providing aid in dying.44
  1. Massachusetts Has No Explicit Prohibition of Aid in Dying
 If a legislature desires to criminalize aid in dying, it may do so. Such legislation 
must set forth with specificity the conduct that is proscribed.45 A number of states 
have enacted statutes sufficiently specific to outlaw aid in dying: For example, 
Arkansas specifically makes “physician-assisted suicide” a crime.46 This statute 
applies to a “physician . . . willfully prescribing any drug, compound, or substance for 
the express purpose of assisting a patient to intentionally end the patient’s life.” Idaho 
is another example of a state that has enacted a statute sufficiently specific to reach 
the conduct of a physician providing a prescription for aid in dying.47
44. See Wingfield & Hacker, supra note 42 (“Massachusetts [law contains] no statutory prohibition of 
physician-assisted suicide or assisted suicide generally.”). Nor would there be grounds for a federal 
prosecution under the only possibly pertinent federal statute, the Controlled Substances Act (CSA), 
Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 801 (2013)). The CSA is intended to 
combat drug abuse and control trafficking in controlled substances. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 
243, 272 (2006). It is clear that there is no basis under the CSA for prosecution of a physician prescribing 
controlled substances for aid in dying. See id. at 274–75. In Gonzales, a case considering the possibility of 
CSA prosecution of a physician providing aid in dying in Oregon, the court held that the intention of 
the CSA would not support such action:
Viewed in its context, the prescription requirement is better understood as a provision 
that ensures patients use controlled substances under the supervision of a doctor so as to 
prevent addiction and recreational abuse. As a corollary, the provision also bars doctors 
from peddling to patients who crave the drugs for those prohibited uses. To read 
prescriptions for assisted suicide as constituting “drug abuse” under the CSA is 
discordant with the phrase’s consistent use throughout the statute, not to mention its 
ordinary meaning.
 Id. at 275 (citation omitted).
45. See Commonwealth v. Alexander, 185 Mass. 551, 554 (1904) (“Criminal statutes are to be construed 
strictly. The court cannot extend or enlarge a statute to create an offense which is not created by the 
language of the enactment.”); see also Henry Campbell Black, Book Note, Handbook on the Construction 
and Interpretation of the Laws, 21 Yale L.J. 172 (1911). Penal statutes must define the criminal offense 
with sufficient clarity so ordinary people can understand what conduct is prohibited. See Kolender v. 
Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 353, 357 (1983); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 617 (1954).
46. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-10-106 (West 2013).
47. Idaho Code Ann. § 18-4017(5) (West 2013) (providing immunity to physicians for treating pain or 
symptoms but making clear that if a prescription is for the purpose of causing death, the immunity 
would not apply and the physician would be subject to criminal exposure).
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 Massachusetts may choose to outlaw aid in dying, as these states have chosen to 
do, but has not done so to date. If Massachusetts does prohibit the practice, the law 
must be sufficiently specific. Criminal statutes are construed strictly, not expansively, 
and are not extended or enlarged by implication to embrace conduct not included in 
the express terms of the text.48
  2.  Massachusetts, Unlike Many States, Does Not Have a Broad Vague Prohibition 
Against “Assisted Suicide”
 Not only is there no explicit prohibition of aid in dying in Massachusetts; there is 
not even a broad vague prohibition against “assisted suicide,”49 as seen in many other 
states, that could arguably provide a basis for a prosecution for aid in dying.50 Of 
course, aid in dying may—and ought to—fall outside the scope of these statutes.51 
Physicians may nevertheless fear that they might be prosecuted for “assisting suicide” 
if they provide aid in dying. That fear, however, is groundless in Massachusetts 
because there is no statute prohibiting “assisted suicide” that could even arguably 
support such a prosecution. Specifically, the Massachusetts manslaughter statute 
does not prohibit the act of “assisting or aiding suicide.”52
  3.  Massachusetts Common Law Does Not Address the Act of a Physician Providing 
Aid in Dying
 Looking to Massachusetts case law for any reported cases that may be relevant to 
aid in dying, one looks largely in vain. The Massachusetts manslaughter statute has 
in one case been applied to reach “aiding self-murder.”53 But application of the 
manslaughter statute to aid in dying would not be tenable under this case law. First, 
a dying patient ingesting medication to achieve a peaceful death and avoid further 
suffering in the final stage of terminal illness is not engaging in “self-murder.”54 To 
the contrary, such a patient seeks to preserve the integrity and coherence of the self 
48. See supra note 45. 
49. See Wingfield & Hacker, supra note 42.
50. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 16-5-5 (West 2013); Ind. Code Ann. § 35-42-1-2.5 (West 2013); N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:11-6 (West 2013); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-2-4 (West 2013); N.D. Cent. Code Ann. 
§ 12.1-16-04 (West 2013); Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 163.117 (West 2013); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
2505 (West 2013).
51. The choice of a dying patient for a peaceful death is recognized to be fundamentally different from 
“suicide” by mental health, medical, and health policy professionals. See, e.g., Farberman, supra note 39; 
Smith & Pollack, supra note 39; see also Tucker, supra note 2, at 45 (discussing medical and health policy 
organizations’ policies recognizing this distinction). Whether an “assisted suicide” statute reaches aid in 
dying is the subject of litigation in New Mexico. See First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and 
Injunctive Relief, Morris v. New Mexico, D-202-CV-2012-02909 (N.M. 2d Jud. Dist. Ct. May 9, 2012).
52. Massachusetts’s manslaughter statute does not prohibit the act of “assisting or aiding suicide.” See Mass. 
Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 265, § 13 (West 2013). 
53. See Persampieri v. Commonwealth, 175 N.E.2d 387, 389 (Mass. 1961).
54. See supra notes 27–29, 33–35, 38–40, and accompanying text.
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in the face of inexorable deterioration as illness progresses. Second, it is hard to 
imagine that the facts of this bizarre “self-murder” case would be deemed to have any 
bearing on aid in dying. In Persampieri v. Commonwealth, a husband was found guilty 
of manslaughter for aiding and abetting his wife’s suicide.55 Upon telling his wife 
that he wanted a divorce, the wife responded by threatening to kill herself.56 After 
the husband taunted her and helped her to load and position the gun, his wife shot 
herself.57 It is unlikely that the court’s holding on these starkly distinguishable and 
horrific facts would have any bearing upon a physician’s conduct in providing aid in 
dying to a mentally competent, terminally ill patient.
 Other than this case, there is no case law that may apply to aid in dying in 
Massachusetts. Given that Massachusetts law empowers patients to make autonomous 
decisions about end-of-life care—and absent a criminal prohibition that could 
reasonably be construed to reach aid in dying—it is reasonable to conclude that 
physicians may provide this end-of-life option, subject to standards of professional 
practice, without significant risk of a viable criminal prosecution. This would place 
Massachusetts alongside Hawaii, as a “silent” state, in the governance of this practice.58 
iii. aid in dYing: gOVErnEd bY prOfEssiOnaL praCtiCE standards
 Most medical care is not governed by statute or court decision, but instead by 
professional practice standards, also referred to as “best practices” or the “standard of 
care.”59 In Massachusetts, the standard of care for a general practitioner is defined as 
the degree of care and skill of the average practitioner while taking into account 
advances in the profession.60 A specialist, likewise, is held to the standard of care and 
55. See Persampieri, 175 N.E.2d at 389–90.
56. Id. at 389.
57. Id.
58. See infra Part IV.C.
59. 61 Am. Jur. 2d Physicians, Surgeons, and Other Healers § 189 (2013).
60. See Palandjian v. Foster, 842 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Mass. 2006); see also Commonwealth v. Pierce, 138 
Mass. 165 (1884) (upholding the conviction of a physician where the physician ordered that patient-
decedent be soaked in kerosene). The Pierce opinion stated:
 If a person publicly practising as a physician, on being called upon to attend a sick 
woman, prescribes, with foolhardy presumption or gross recklessness, a course of 
treatment which causes her death, he may be found guilty of manslaughter, although he 
acted with her consent, and with no evil intent. . . .
 Injurious acts resulting from gross carelessness or foolhardy presumption, without 
intent to injure, may constitute an assault. . . . The same general principle applies to 
medical treatment. The government must show, not merely the absence of ordinary 
care, but gross carelessness amounting to recklessness. A man is not to be convicted of 
manslaughter merely because of his ignorance. His ignorance is only important as 
bearing upon the question whether his conduct in the care and treatment of the patient 
was marked by foolhardy presumption or gross and reckless carelessness. The defendant 
in this case is to be tried by no other or higher standard of skill or learning than that 
which he necessarily assumed in treating her; that is, that he was able to do so, without 
gross recklessness or foolhardy presumption in undertaking it. It is not necessary to 
270
Give Me Liberty at My Death: expanDinG enD-of-Life ChoiCe in MassaChusetts
skill of the average member of the profession practicing his or her specialty, while 
taking into account advances in the profession.61 Some jurisdictions have adopted the 
“respectable minority” standard in analyzing claims of medical negligence.62 This 
doctrine recognizes that a physician may legitimately engage in one of several 
recognized treatments and that the chosen treatment will not be deemed outside the 
standard of care merely because it has been adopted by only a minority of physicians.63 
Massachusetts has not considered the “respectable minority” rule, neither embracing 
nor rejecting it. Aid in dying is a “recognized course of treatment” as the practice has 
become increasingly accepted among medical and health policy organizations.64 
Surely a “respectable minority” of Massachusetts physicians who provide end-of-life 
care would provide aid in dying to eligible patients requesting it, if they felt safe 
doing so.65
show an evil intent; if, by gross and reckless negligence, he caused the death, he is 
guilty of culpable homicide.
 Id. at 171.
61. See Palandjian, 842 N.E.2d at 916.
62. See Chumbler v. McClure, 505 F.2d 489, 492 (6th Cir. 1974) (finding that nine physicians constituted a 
respectable minority so as to insulate the defendant-physician from liability for medical negligence); 
Hood v. Phillips, 537 S.W.2d 291, 294 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976), aff ’d, 554 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. 1977); Borja 
v. Phoenix Gen. Hosp., Inc., 727 P.2d 355, 355 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986); Schwab v. Tolley, 345 So. 2d 747, 
753 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). See generally Meghan C. O’Connor, The Physician-Patient Relationship 
and the Professional Standard of Care: Reevaluating Medical Negligence Principles to Achieve the Goals of Tort 
Reform, 46 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 109, 126–27 (2010).
63. See Chumbler, 505 F.2d at 492.
64. See Tucker, supra note 2. Organizations with policies supportive of aid in dying include the American 
Medical Women’s Association (AMWA), http://www.amwa-doc.org/cms_files/original/Aid_in_
Dying1.Pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2013); the American Medical Students’ Association (AMSA), http://
www.amsa.org/AMSA/Libraries/Exec_Docs/2013_PPP.sf lb.ashx, at 76 (last visited Dec. 28, 2013); the 
American College of Legal Medicine (ACLM), http://www.aclm.org/resources/amicus_briefs/
ACLM%20Aid%20in%20Dying%20Policy.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2013); the American Public Health 
Association (APHA), http://www.apha.org/advocacy/policy/policysearch/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2013). 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized aid in dying as a legitimate medical practice. See Gonzales v. 
Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006); see also Kathryn L. Tucker, U.S. Supreme Court Ruling Preserves Oregon’s 
Landmark Death with Dignity Law, 2:2 Nat’l Acad. Elder Law Att’ys J. 291–301 (2006). Clinical 
Practice Guidelines for aid in dying have been promulgated and were recently endorsed by AMWA. 
AMWA Advocacy History & Timeline, AMWA-doc.org, http://www.amwa-doc.org/advocacy/history-
timeline ((last visited Dec. 28, 2013).
65. Physicians, including members of the Harvard Medical School faculty, were leading spokespersons 
for—and supporters of—Question 2. Dr. Marcia Angell, a physician, professor at Harvard Medical 
School, and the first woman editor of the nation’s most distinguished medical journal, the New England 
Journal of Medicine, was among them. See Marcia Angell, May Doctors Help You to Die?, N.Y. Rev. Books 
(Oct. 11, 2012), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2012/oct/11/may-doctors-help-
you-die/ (“I have long favored legalizing physician-assisted dying for terminally ill patients whose 
suffering cannot be relieved in any other way, and I was the first of the original fourteen petitioners to 
put the Massachusetts Death with Dignity Act on the ballot in November. In 1997, as executive editor 
of the New England Journal of Medicine . . . I wrote an editorial favoring it, and told the story of my 
father, who shot himself rather than endure a protracted death from metastatic cancer of the prostate.”).
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 As discussed above, Massachusetts law empowers patients to make autonomous 
decisions regarding their end-of-life care. Under this framework, a standard of care 
has already emerged in which physicians, respecting patient autonomy, engage in 
life-ending practices in caring for terminally ill patients. For example, physicians 
discontinue a variety of life-prolonging treatments, including cardiac devices, 
ventilators, dialysis, feeding tubes, and medication—aware that doing so will 
certainly or likely precipitate death. They also provide palliative support to patients 
who choose to stop eating and drinking. Physicians may receive requests from 
mentally competent, terminally ill patients for a prescription for medication that 
would provide peace of mind and, if ingested, enable the patient to achieve a peaceful 
death. For physicians who believe such care is medically appropriate and are willing 
to provide it, best practices for aid in dying in Massachusetts will evolve and likely be 
informed by other jurisdictions that have more experience with an open practice of 
aid in dying. These jurisdictions, and the experiences in each, are discussed below.
iV.  aid-in-dYing praCtiCE in OthEr statEs WiLL infOrM prOfEssiOnaL 
praCtiCEs in MassaChUsEtts
 A. States with Statutory Permission
  1. Aid in Dying in Oregon 
 Oregon enacted statutory permission for aid in dying in 1994 when voters 
approved passage of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act.66 Opponents delayed 
implementation of the act for three years through an ultimately unsuccessful lawsuit.67 
Consequently, in 1998, aid in dying became an open and transparent practice in 
Oregon with the dismissal of that suit.68 Oregon’s statutory permission for aid in 
dying allows a mentally competent, terminally ill patient to request a prescription for 
medication that he or she may ingest to bring about a peaceful death.69 Oregon’s law 
requires the collection and reporting of a tremendous amount of data about patients 
who choose aid in dying and their reasons for doing so. This data has shown that 
when aid in dying is an available option, none of the harms opponents had speculated 
about came to pass.70 In the face of this evidence, opponents increasingly recognize 
66. Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 127.800–897 (West 2013).
67. See Lee v. Oregon, 107 F.3d 1382 (9th Cir. 1997).
68. See Death with Dignity Act, Or. Health Auth., http://public.health.oregon.gov/ProviderPartnerResources/
Evaluationresearch/deathwithdignityact/Pages/index.aspx (last visited Dec. 28, 2013).
69. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 127.805.
70. See Margaret P. Battin et al., Legal Physician-Assisted Dying in Oregon and the Netherlands: Evidence 
Concerning the Impact on Patients in “Vulnerable” Groups, 33 J. Med. Ethics 591 (Oct. 2007); Timothy 
E. Quill & Christine K. Cassel, Professional Organizations’ Position Statements on Physician-Assisted 
Suicide: A Case for Studied Neutrality, 138 Annals Internal Med. 208 (Feb. 4, 2003); Linda Ganzini 
et al., Oregon Physicians’ Attitudes About and Experiences with End-of-Life Care Since Passage of the Oregon 
Death with Dignity Act, 285:18 JAMA 2363 (May 2001), available at http://jama.jamanetwork.com/
article.aspx?articleid=193817&resultClick=3 (reviewing Oregon’s experience with its Death with 
Dignity Act and concluding that no harm occurred to vulnerable populations); Melinda A. Lee & 
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that opposition to aid in dying can be justified only on personal moral or religious 
grounds.71 Medical and health policy groups, including the American Public Health 
Association, have adopted policies supportive of the practice after taking a careful 
look at the experience in Oregon with aid in dying.72
  2. Aid in Dying in Washington 
 In 2008, Washington voters, undoubtedly influenced by the positive experience 
in Oregon, adopted a statutory permission for aid in dying nearly identical to that in 
Oregon, also through the initiative process.73 Washington began implementing its 
law in March 2009.74 As in Oregon, the Washington statute requires the state to 
gather and publish data regarding aid in dying as reported by health care providers.75 
The data shows that most of those choosing aid in dying in Washington are 
Caucasian, well educated, and dying of cancer.76
  3. Aid in Dying in Vermont
 In the 2013 legislative session, Vermont took the historic step of becoming the first 
state to enact a law to permit aid in dying through the traditional legislative process, 
doing so with a “next generation” approach to the issue.77 Vermont embraces the 
statutory mandates governing the practice as in Oregon and Washington, but only for a 
period of three years.78 After three years, the statutory mandates expire and the practice 
Susan W. Tolle, Oregon’s Assisted Suicide Vote: The Silver Lining, 124 Annals Internal Med. 267 
(1996); Joseph B. Straton, Physician Assistance with Dying: Reframing the Debate; Restricting Access, 15 
Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 475, 479–82 (2006).
71. See Daniel E. Lee, Physician-Assisted Suicide: A Conservative Critique of Intervention, 33 Hastings Ctr. 
Rep. 1, 17 (2003).
72. See Tucker, supra note 2.
73. See Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 70.245.010–904 (West 2013).
74. See Wash. State Dep’t of Health, 2009 Death with Dignity Act Report (2009), available at 
http://www.doh.wa.gov/portals/1/Documents/5300/DWDA2009.pdf.
75. See Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 127.855 (West 2013); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.245.150.
76. Wash. State Dep’t of Health, 2011 Death with Dignity Act Report (2011), available at http://
www.doh.wa.gov/portals/1/Documents/5300/DWDA2011.pdf.
77. Vermont Senate Bill 77 was passed by the Senate on February 14, 2013, and the House on May 13, 2013. 
It was signed into law by the Governor on May 20, 2013. See Kevin Liptak, Vermont Moves to Pass End-of-
Life Choice Law, CNN (May 14, 2013, 8:13 AM), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2013/05/14/
vermont-moves-to-pass-end-of-life-choice-law/; The Vermont Legislative Bill Tracking System, Vt. State 
Legislature, http://www.leg.state.vt.us/database/status/summary.cfm?Bill=S.0077 (last visited Dec. 28, 
2013). The Vermont law reflects an interesting new experiment in the “laboratory of the States,” as invited 
by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 737 (1997) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (quoting Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990)).
78. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 5283 (West 2013) (to be repealed July 1, 2016) (immunity for prescription 
and documentation); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit 18, §§ 5289–90 (West 2013) (effective July 1, 2016) (protecting 
patient choice at end of life and immunity for physicians). The remaining sections of this act shall take 
effect on passage.
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will be governed by professional practice standards.79 Physicians will continue to be 
protected from criminal, civil, and professional liability for providing aid in dying.80
 B.  Aid in Dying Absent an Explicit Statutory Permission: The Montana Supreme 
Court Speaks
 The Montana Supreme Court recognizes the right of its citizens to freely choose aid 
in dying, even where no statute specifically authorizes the practice.81 In Baxter v. State, 
Robert Baxter, a seventy-five-year-old patient dying of cancer, sued the State of Montana 
to establish his right to choose aid in dying.82 Baxter argued that (1) Montanans have a 
right to aid in dying that is protected by the Montana state constitutional guarantees of 
privacy and individual dignity;83 and (2) alternatively, physicians who provide aid in 
dying could not be subject to prosecution for homicide because of the state’s “consent as 
a defense” doctrine under the Montana homicide statute.84
 The Montana Supreme Court declined to reach the state constitutional issues, 
resolving the case on statutory grounds.85 The court held that Montana’s advance 
directive statute, the Rights of the Terminally Ill Act, reflects a policy of the state to 
vest patients with broad autonomy over medical decisionmaking and to leave these 
decisions to the individual.86 Aid in dying was therefore recognized as a choice left to 
the individual as a matter of patient autonomy.87 Accordingly, the court held that no 
prosecution of a physician providing aid in dying would be proper.88 Physicians need 
79. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 5283, 5289–90.
80. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 5283, 5289–90. For a detailed discussion of the Vermont law permitting 
aid in dying, see Kathryn L. Tucker, Vermont’s Patient Choice at End of Life Act: A Historic “Next 
Generation” Law Governing Aid in Dying (forthcoming 2014) (on file with the Vermont Law Review).
81. See Baxter v. State, 224 P.3d 1211, 1215 (Mont. 2009).
82. See id. at 1214. Additional plaintiffs included four Montana physicians who treat terminal illnesses, as 
well as Compassion & Choices, the national nonprofit organization which advocates to protect and 
expand the rights of the terminally ill.
83. Id.
84. See Mont. Code Ann. § 45-2-211(1) (West 2013) (providing that the “consent of the victim to conduct 
charged to constitute an offense or to the result thereof is a defense”).
85. See Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1215–16.
86. See id. at 1215.
87. See id.
88. See id. Opponents of aid in dying in Montana, including a group called Montanans Against Assisted 
Suicide, assert that Baxter did nothing more than recognize a potential defense to a physician providing 
aid in dying. See Greg Jackson & Matt Bowman, Baxter Case Analysis: Analysis of Implications of the 
Baxter Case on Potential Criminal Liability, Montanans Against Assisted Suicide, http://www.
montanansagainstassistedsuicide.org/p/baxter-case-analysis.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2013). This 
plainly misrepresents the decision and its impact. Prosecuting attorneys are public servants and licensed 
members of the Bar. Filing a criminal charge against a physician who acted within the bounds 
recognized in Baxter would be frivolous, or possibly malicious, and potentially expose that prosecutor to 
sanctions for violating the state’s rules of professional responsibility, so long as the patient was terminally 
ill and gave effective consent to the treatment. See generally Mont. R. Prof’l Conduct 3.8 (2004).
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not fear disciplinary action either—at least, no more so than when providing any 
other medical procedure or engaging in any other medical practice. The Montana 
Board of Medical Examiners adopted a position statement on aid in dying in 2011 
stating this position. This seemingly small and modest statement is actually 
enormously significant because it reflects the normalization of aid in dying within 
the practice of medicine.89
 Montana physicians are not subject to the statutes that govern the practice of aid 
in dying in Oregon, Washington, and, for a three-year period, Vermont. However, 
the Montana Supreme Court recognized certain boundaries which are codified in 
those other states’ statutory schemes: a patient must be both terminally ill and 
mentally competent, and the physician’s role is limited to providing a prescription for 
medication that would, if ingested, precipitate a peaceful death.90 Beyond these 
bright lines established in Baxter, the practice of aid in dying in Montana is developing 
in end-of-life medical practice, subject to best practices.91 Because the practice is not 
governed by statute in Montana, there is no required reporting by physicians about 
patients choosing aid in dying.92
 C. Aid in Dying in “Silent” States: Hawaii Leads the Way
 An open practice of aid in dying began in Hawaii in 2011, subject to the best 
practices approach outlined in this article.93 A conference held in Hawaii in October 
2011 explored the views of leading experts in law, medicine, civil rights, and health 
policy, on the law and policy landscape governing end-of-life care in Hawaii. These 
experts concluded that an open practice of aid in dying could emerge under existing 
law, subject to best practices.94 A Physicians’ Advisory Council for Aid in Dying 
89. See Mont. Bd. Of Med. Examiners, Physician Aid in Dying (Mar. 16, 2012).
90. See Baxter, 224 P.3d at 1215; Or. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 127.05 (West 2013); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit 18, § 5283 
(West 2013); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 70.245.010 (West 2013).
91. Montana physicians have openly provided aid in dying since Baxter, and support their patients having 
access to this option. See, e.g., Span, supra note 15 (reporting the experience of Montana hospice and 
palliative care physician Dr. Eric Kress, who testified against a proposed legislative prohibition of aid in 
dying in the 2013 legislative session and who has responded to ten patient requests for aid in dying in the 
first three years following Baxter and provided prescriptions to three of the ten patients, including one who 
was in the terminal stage of Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS) and two who were dying of cancer).
92. Attempts to enact statutory regulations or a prohibition of aid in dying have failed in two successive 
sessions of the Montana legislature. Most recently, the Montana Senate defeated H.B. 505, which would 
have mandated prison sentences and fines for physicians who provide aid in dying to terminally ill patients. 
See Dylan Scott, Physician-Assisted Suicide Bills Die in Montana, Governing (Apr. 8, 2013), http://www.
governing.com/blogs/view/gov-montana-experiences-two-extremes-of-aid-in-dying-debate.html.
93. For a full discussion of the law and policy pertinent to aid in dying in Hawaii, see Tucker, supra note 9, 
at 9 (discussing the emergence of aid in dying as a practice that is governed by best practices in Hawaii). 
94. See, e.g., Scott Foster, Expert Panel Concurs: Hawaii Physicians Can Provide Aid in Dying, Haw. Rep. 
(Oct. 5, 2011), available at http://www.hawaiireporter.com/expert-panel-concurs-hawaii-physicians-
can-provide-aid-in-dying/123; Barbara Coombs Lee, Hawaii: The Latest State Where Doctors Can 
Provide Aid in Dying, Huffington Post (Oct. 6, 2011, 3:04 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
barbara-coombs-lee/hawaii-aid-in-dying_b_995217.html.
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formed, and physicians began evaluating requests for aid in dying and prescribing 
medication to mentally competent, terminally ill adults who met eligibility criteria 
and would derive a palliative benefit from the option.95 There have been no 
investigations or prosecutions of Hawaii physicians providing aid in dying—despite 
open discussion in the media of the fact that physicians are engaging in this practice.96 
 Key similarities exist in Hawaii and Massachusetts with regard to the practice of 
aid in dying, including the fact that both states have statutes empowering patients 
with autonomy over medical and end-of-life decisionmaking and the absence of any 
statute that can reasonably be read to address and outlaw the practice. In such 
situations, it is reasonable to conclude that the practice can be governed by professional 
practice standards.
V.  COnCLUsiOn: aid in dYing Can EMErgE as an End-Of-LifE OptiOn in 
MassaChUsEtts gOVErnEd bY prOfEssiOnaL praCtiCE standards
 Massachusetts voters considered—but did not adopt—an initiative permitting 
aid in dying in the November 2012 election. Yet it appears that the practice can 
nevertheless emerge without the need for a change in state law. Physicians who 
believe their patients should have this option should step forward and begin providing 
this treatment.
 End-of-life medical practice openly includes aid in dying in Oregon, Washington, 
Montana, Hawaii, and, most recently, Vermont. Furthermore, a growing number of 
medical and health policy organizations have adopted policies supportive of aid in 
dying.97 These facts demonstrate that this option is increasingly accepted.98 The 
practice in Oregon, Washington, Montana, and Hawaii, as well as policies adopted 
by influential medical and health policy organizations, and emerging authoritative 
literature99—will influence practice in other states, including Massachusetts.
 Against this backdrop, it is timely for aid in dying to emerge in Massachusetts as 
an end-of-life option governed by professional practice standards. The law of the state 
recognizes that patients are empowered with autonomy in end-of-life decisionmaking. 
95. See Haw. Physician Advisory Counsel for Aid in Dying, Annual Report: October 5, 2011–October 
4, 2012, available at http://community.compassionandchoices.org/document.doc?id=1242&erid=265611 (last 
visited Dec. 28, 2013).
96. Opponents of aid in dying sought and obtained an opinion from the Hawaii Attorney General, dated 
December 8, 2011, that takes the position that a criminal prosecution could be brought. Hawaii Law on 
Assistance with Dying, Op. Haw. Att’y Gen. (Dec. 8, 2011), available at http://choiceisanillusion.files.
wordpress.com/2011/12/ag_opinion_as_not_legal.pdf. The reasoning in this opinion is unpersuasive 
for a number of reasons, including the failure to recognize the constellation of Hawaii laws that ref lect 
it is the policy of the state to vest its citizens with broad autonomy over end-of-life decisions.
97. See Tucker, supra note 2, at 45; AMWA Advocacy History & Timeline, supra note 64.
98. See Tucker, supra note 2, at 45; AMWA Advocacy History & Timeline, supra note 64.
99. See Kathryn L. Tucker, Aid in Dying: Guidance for an Emerging End-of-Life Practice, 142 Chest 218, 
218–24 (2012) (arguing that it is timely for clinical practice guidelines for aid in dying to emerge and 
that these guidelines will inform the practice and standards of care); see also AMWA Advocacy History & 
Timeline, supra note 64.
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In addition, no Massachusetts law prohibits the practice with sufficient specificity. 
Accordingly, aid in dying can emerge within end-of-life medical practices governed 
by best practices. This would extend an important additional choice to mentally 
competent, terminally ill Massachusetts residents who confront a dying process that 
they may find unbearable.

